



11 July 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Intelligence

FROM : Assistant Director, CR

SUBJECT Consultants' Report

1. In setting the date of 11 July for my final accounting on the Consultants: report you have made it impossible for me to reply to its countless criticisms effectively. Perhaps this is just as well. It is easy to toss off criticisms and sloppy generalities, and it doesn't take much time to do it, but it takes a long while and much painstaking work to answer them effectively. Most likely the Ten Horrible Cases cited in the report were "discovered" and written up in the space of a few hours, though it took me the better part of a week to examine them in detail, discuss each with the people concerned, and finally to write my memorandum of 1 July which showed, beyond any possible dispute, that most of them were untrue and misleading - the product of inquiries so hasty and so careless that they could only be described as irresponsible. Probably it would take me many months to reply to all the other criticisms in the same way, and very likely it would not be worth the effort. But since I must account to you for the whole report by July 11th it becomes necessary for me to (a) speak in general terms rather than specific, (b) discuss only the more important recommendations, and (c) leave many questions unanswered.

Intelligence Periodicals Index (IPI)

2. My memoranda of 18 June and 1 July have proved that most of the criticisms of the Intellofax system are thoroughly unsound, and it is certain that we should reject the Consultants' most important recommendation, i.e. that the Intellofax System should be phased out as rapidly as possible and replaced by an expanded IPI.

With all its admitted imperfections, the Intellofax System is doing a far better job for us than any conventional

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published index could do. To reassure myself on this score I made a close scrutiny of the Bibliography of Agriculture (BoA) which is, as all agree, one of the best published indexes in existence. This study is appended hereto as Tab A, and it shows quite clearly the kind of difficulties we would get ourselves into if we accepted the Consultants' proposal.

An IPI big enough to index all incoming substantive intelligence, as recommended by the Consultants, would be of immense bulk. Each monthly issue would be nearly as big as the Washington telephone directory. Semiannual or annual cumulative issues would be 6 times or 12 times as big unless it were decided not to repeat titles in the cumulative issues but to provide only document or page numbers which the analyst would have to search out one by one in the preceding monthly issues. To get the references to documents on a given subject over a 5-year span the analyst would have to work through 5 annual or 10 semiannual cumulations. Is it reasonable to suppose that the man who complains about having to read several hundred titles on an Intellofax tape would be willing to read or search out the hundreds of titles listed under appropriate subject headings in several volumes each as big as the fattest NIS?

The fact is that most of the defects which are found in the Bibliography of Agriculture are unavoidable in any published bibliography. They cannot be eliminated even with unlimited budget and manpower. That is why CIA set out to develop a mechanized system, and it is why himself spent so many years trying to develop a mechanized Rapid Selector.

I cannot leave this subject without a speculation as to why the Consultants attacked the Intellofax System so recklessly and irresponsibly. The blind violence of this attack, spearheaded by reminded me of nothing so much as the American Medical Association charging off with loud hue and cry after some village bonesetter. I really believe that was infuriated to find that others had succeeded where he himself had failed - that while the rapid selector he worked on for so many years is dead as the dodo* a different approach to the same problems has overcome the mechanical difficulties and created a system which, however imperfectly, is

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^{*} A fact which himself refuses to admit, but which can be confirmed by anyone who wishes to phone the Patent Office and ask them what they are doing with it. Our phone call brought the reply that if CIA was interested in it they would gladly let us have it for about two dollars and fifty cents.

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able to carry an even bigger workload than that in the Department of Agriculture. This fury, I surmise, brought on so severe an emotional disturbance that he became incapable of telling black from white. I can think of nothing else which could account for the way he shuffled perfectly simple and straightforward data in such a way as to produce false arguments in support of his prejudice.

I recommend, in conclusion on these subjects, (a) that we go ahead with Intellofax and our planning for Minicard, doing our best to correct such genuine deficiencies as we can find, and (b) that we continue to exclude most types of information reports and unfinished intelligence from the IPI.

Intelligence Subject Code

3. The criticisms of the Intelligence Subject Code are generally sound, and we are already taking steps to comply with the recommendation on page xxx that it be revised and made internally consistent. The devoted and competent staff which has developed the ISC has gone too far in attempting to satisfy all the specialists, each of whom wants to see his section of the code expanded into great detail. The ISC has in truth become too detailed for efficient and consistent use, and we must whittle it down. Other agencies also are using it however, and Air Force wants to expand the aeronautical segments of the code into the most minute detail. We cannot prevent them from doing this for their own purposes, even though we may think it a mistake, but we can decide unilaterally to use only the first four digits of that section of the code for our own purposes. Some such solution as this will have to be found, and we are working on it in a Working Group of the AHIP Committee.

No subject code is perfect. The Bibliography of Agriculture's index is very imperfect even for agricultural subjects, and as I have shown in Tab A it cannot be used without inconsistencies. All the specialists criticise each other's classification schemes, and no two agree. Hundreds of "documentation experts" hold dreary conferences almost every month to discuss the general theory of indexing and classification, and they seldom achieve anything more tangible than to "point up the importance of the problem". They are like the Concord Transcendentalists of whom it was said, "They dive into the illimitable, and they soar into the infinite, and they never pay cash."

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I recommend, with regard to the Intelligence Subject Code, that we go ahead along the lines which I have outlined above and on which we have already started. This is in accord with the recommendations of the Consultants. (Let us not forget, however, that the course which we must steer lies between two dangers: we must avoid the extremes of complexity which now make the code so hard to use consistently, but we must also avoid extremes of simplification which would make it impossible for us to pinpoint requests with a certain measure of selectivity. The simpler the code the more numerous the titles falling in any given subject category, and we do not wish to give the analyst who is looking for a specific subject too many cards bearing on related subjects.)

Map Library and Foreign Documents Division

4. It has been suggested many times before that the Map Library and Foreign Documents Division be merged into OCR on the ground that they are basically reference services, and in 1948 I was inclined to think this might be necessary in order to lessen the jurisdictional disputes and overlaps. At this time I can see no advantage in the suggestion at all, as there no longer is any friction between the several units and extremely little if any duplication of effort. It is certain that the reference librarians should know of the existence of both FDD and Map Library, and should remind their customers of the services which they offer, and it will be a good thing to have both of them located in the new building right beside OCR. Even then, however, I doubt that much would be gained by rearranging the chain of command.

I recommend that this recommendation be put on ice until 1960.

OCR Reorganization - Three Deputies?

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A two-way split would be better than this, creating perhaps a Deputy for Information Services who would have under his charge the central Reference Staff, the map and library reading rooms, and the Registers; and setting up a second Deputy for Technical Support who would have all the rest. Thought might well be given at this point to the question of

I recommend that we move slowly on this proposal. Reorganization for the sake of reorganization is always bad, creating more problems than it solves, and I believe we can work
effectively toward a central Reference Staff (see the following
paragraph) without having to toss all the rest of OCR in the
blanket.

Central Reference Staff

6. The proposal that there be created a Central Reference Staff has merit, though there is no doubt that the Consultants greatly exaggerate when they assert that for want of such a staff there is now much confusion and duplication of effort. There is no evidence to support such a contention, and it probably happens very rarely that information which should be sought from one of the Registers is, instead, wrongfully sought from the Intellofax system.*

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^{*} The Consultants do claim that the Intellofax system is often wrongly used for searches which might better be made in other ways, and they cite some examples of this. I don't have time to scrutinize them in detail, but it seems almost certain after a quick look-see that these examples are as ill-considered and misleading as the others in connection with the Intellofax system which I have already reported on. It is true that the system is sometimes used for what seem on the surface to be unlikely purposes, but when this is done it is because all else has failed. And, sometimes to our considerable surprise, the last shot try quite often does pay off. Documents which could not be identified or located in any other way have sometimes been found by the Intellofax system, and, despite one of the Consultants' examples, we did once find a crew list in this way after all else had failed.

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The reference librarians do refer customers to the Registers and to other sources of information when appropriate, and if they use the Intellofax system for what seem like strange purposes it is generally because all else has been tried and has failed to give the desired data.

We should do more than we have done in the way of training our reference librarians in the use of facilities outside the Library, and this can be done with or without reorganization. As to putting individual people from the Registers into a central Reference Staff, however, there is room for doubt: there are, in fact, as good reasons against it as there are for it.

The experience of our Registers has always been that they can best serve the customers, and do so with least waste motion, when they talk directly with them. Each "channel" between the Register's analyst and the customer leads to less perfect understanding of what is really wanted, and this in turn causes waste motion. Often, for example, Biographic Register finds that a request from one of the Requirements Staffs of the other Offices is reasonably lucid in most respects but needs to be clarified in one or two. When this is the case it speaks, if possible, directly with the customer; and almost invariably it is found that energy would have been misspent and time wasted if the job had been started without this additional clarification. Since the Register is as near to every customer as is the telephone, it takes no longer for the customer to say what he wants directly to the Register than it would for him to say it to a middleman.

The Consultants' proposal, of course, is based entirely on the supposition that customers would get better and faster service, at less cost to themselves, if the Registers maintained "contact men" or "liaison officers" in the Central Reference Staff. I think there is much doubt that this would really pay off for the customers, and it certainly would not make the Registers themselves more efficient.

I recommend that we commence building up the present Reference Branch of the Library, emphasizing its position much as is suggested by the Consultants, and giving fairly intensive training to its members; but that we refrain from any formal reorganization until we have had an experimental trial of the usefulness of putting Register liaison officers into the staff. As a start, each Register might be required to place one person full-time with the reference librarians for a week or so. Such person would receive directly all requests which came to the Library for services which his Register could handle. After a few weeks the Reference Branch and the Registers should be called upon for comment as to the usefulness of the venture.

Hard Copy versus Aperture Cards and Microfilm

7. We developed the aperture card system in order (1) to conserve floorspace, (2) to conserve file cabinets, (3) to ensure that our file would always be complete - i.e., that we would never find ourselves in the position of being unable to locate or copy a particular document because of its having been borrowed by an analyst or misfiled. These are good reasons, and they are as sound today as they were when we first acted on them. The Consultants doubtless speak in good faith when they say that some of the analysts have expressed a desire to browse in hard copy files, just as one browses in the book stacks of a university library, but it was our experience while we had the hard copy files that analysts seldom or never took advantage of this opportunity. The reason is not far to seek. Browsing in file cabinets where the documents of necessity are filed according to source rather than by subject matter is not very rewarding, and it is very irksome. I am entirely certain that we would lose far more than we would gain if we adapted the Consultants' recommendations on this score.

I recommend that we reject the Consultants' proposals with regard to a hard copy file.

Space Rearrangements

8. The Consultants' suggestions as to space arrangements in the new building seem to me entirely sound, and you have already approved my recommendation that we accept them for the present, subject to such changes as may become necessary before the time of moving in 1960 or later.

The other suggestions as to rearrangement of the Riverside Stadium at the present time depend upon acceptance of the recommendations for abandoning Intellofax, going back to a conventional published index, and setting up hard copy files. All these latter are thoroughly unsound and, in my view, unacceptable. It follows that we cannot and should not at the present time attempt to shuffle our space arrangements in M-Building or the Stadium

I recommend that no change be made in our present space arrangements, but that the plan for a Central Reference Staff in the new building be retained. We can experiment with the Central Reference Staff idea right here where we are, and can subsequently adapt the plans for the new building to accord with what we decide we want.

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Library Collections

9. The Consultants are quite right in saying that we have held down the purchase of books for reasons of economy and because of space limitations. In the very early days of the Agency it was decided that we should not attempt to build up a big collection of our own, but should buy only (1) reference books of the sort that should be available in the reading room, and (2) other books in accordance with the stated needs of the research and operating offices.

Professional librarians tend to measure each other's prestige by the size of the collections which they administer, and all of them firmly believe that the librarian's first duty is to collect as many books as possible. This is understandable, but not necessarily wise. Our policy has been applauded by the Bureau of the Budget, and by all the many groups who have investigated us except the librarians. As a taxpayer I am in favor of it myself, and even in the new building I see no reason to depart from it. It will not take appreciably longer to get books from the Library of Congress to Langley than it does to get them to 26th Street.

I recommend that we go slow in "building up the collections" even in the new building. Experience shows us from time to time that we need more than we have in the way of basic documents on foreign relations, and when this occurs it is feasible to embark on a program of acquisition in specific fields. This was done in the case of the Treaty Collection, and in the case of HIC. I believe this is a better way to provide ourselves with the books which we need than would be a broad effort to buy more books in all fields of interest to intelligence.

Efficiency and Manpower in the Library

10. The Consultants offer a number of criticisms of the Library's efficiency as compared with the State Department Library, Yale University, and other libraries. A good many of these criticisms are unsound, being based on faulty comparisons of the apples-versus-oranges variety, and there is need to examine each in considerable detail before a decision can be made as to whether manpower really is being wastefully used and, if so, what we should do about it. We have a copy of the memorandum from which the Consultants obtained their information about the State Department Library, and the writer of the memorandum has expressed to us his own belief that the figures

contained in it cannot be directly compared with ours. This is a question which needs to be explored.

I recommend that the charges of inefficiency and wasteful use of manpower be placed before the Management Staff, with a request that they be carefully analyzed and either proven or disproven.

Leadership and Aggressiveness

Il. The Consultants' remarks on these scores are exactly analogous to the remarks made about the Director of Central Intelligence by the various committees which have investigated CIA since 1948. Without any exception, I think, all of these groups have solemnly asserted that the Director has the responsibility to coordinate the intelligence community and sufficient legal authority to do it. He should get busy, and go out and do it. He ought to be more aggressive, and exercise more leadership, and coordinate the other agencies with a stick if necessary.

This is naive. The community cannot be coordinated against its will, and any attempt to provide it with aggressive leadership by CIA will be instantly and strongly resented. This is just as true in the field of central reference services as it is in every other. Much can be done by friendly discussion and voluntary agreement, but very little by fiat. Most of the other agencies have now voluntarily adopted CCR's Intelligence Subject Code, but if we'd tried to ram it down their throats we'd have generated nothing but antagonisms, rival codes in competition with our own, and duplication of effort. CCR was first in the field with a mechanized index system, and other agencies are now moving in the same direction. The AHIP committee is doing a good job of coordinating in nearly all aspects of information processing, and its efforts should be encouraged and fostered.

I recommend that the Consultants' proposals for more aggressive leadership in OCR be put back on the shelf. We can accomplish more by the behavior and methods now being used than we could by trying to crack a whip, or by telling other people how much smarter we are than they.

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James M. Andrews

Attachment - Tab A

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